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Abstract 
Market participants who want to trade “quickly” demand transactional liquidity. Market 
participants who demand to trade “immediately” demand transactional immediacy. Traders 
supply immediacy when the trading returns are high and demand immediacy when the 
trading returns are low. Traders supply immediacy by being non-immediate and traders 
demand immediacy by being immediate. As these time-based expectations are functions of 
the underlying distributions of the clearing prices, one is able to define exact analytical 
functions for time-differing non-immediacy traders. As non-immediacy is heterogenous, a 
range of non-immediacy traders with differing non-immediacies can compete in the 
marketplace and give rise to a “zone” of limit order functions. The bid-ask expectations are 
also assumed to be rank-dependent to maintain transitivity and monotonicity. The limit orders 
placed by non-immediacy traders can then be “picked” off by immediacy traders as they 
arrive at the exchange. A simulation of a simple trading model is undertaken to illustrate the 
mechanism of price formation under rank-dependent non-immediacy trading. In doing so, we 
show that immediacy is a consequence of non-immediacy trading and is provided freely in 
any organised asset markets when participants transmit their demand propensities to the 
market in the form of limit orders. While certain participants such as dealers and specialists 
do indeed (at a price) provide immediacy, they need not be the only providers. 
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1 Introduction 
Market participants adopt “more than one time horizon in the course of their lives, but they 
may also have multiple time horizons at a given moment” (see Dembo and Freeman (1998)). 
They might have some assets to which they attribute to a very long horizon and other assets 
which they attribute a greater immediacy. Alternatively, market participants who want to 
trade “quickly” demand transactional liquidity.1 Market participants supply immediacy when 
the trading returns are high and demand immediacy when the trading returns are low. Market 
participants supply immediacy by being non-immediate and traders demand immediacy by 
being immediate. 
Patient traders obtain superior prices to impatient traders because they are willing to search 
longer and harder to arrange their trades at favourable terms. Impatient traders pay for the 
privilege of trading when they want to trade (see Harris (2002)). Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari 
(1998) conclude that “patient traders are rewarded for placing limit orders, and that eager 
traders are best advised to place market orders”. Schwartz (2000) is of the opinion that when 
it comes to trading “the critical difference may actually be between participants who wish to 
trade with immediacy and those who are willing to trade patiently [with non-immediacy]”.  
A trade is achieved at any time during the trading day when two counterpart orders cross2. 
Counterpart orders cross (see Schwartz and Whitcomb (1988)) when: 
(i) a public trader submits a limit order, and another public trader submits a market 
order which executes against the limit order; 
(ii) an exchange specialist or over-the-counter market maker sets the quote and public 
market order executes against the specialist’s or dealer’s quote; or 
(iii) two or more public traders negotiate a trade. The negotiation may take place on 
the floor of the exchange, or in the upstairs market. 
In the first two cases, one party to a trade can be viewed as an immediacy trader, and the 
other party can be viewed as a non-immediacy trader.3  
                                             
1 Liquidity has many dimensions one of which is “immediacy”. 
2 Say one limit order and one market order. Two limit orders cannot cross by definition. 
3 Schwartz and Whitcomb [1988] use the terms “active” and “passive” traders, but in this paper the terms 
“immediacy” and “non-immediacy” traders are used to stress the time-preference implicit in active and passive 
trading. 
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The participant who is seeking to trade without delay is an immediacy trader; the immediacy 
trader generally incurs an execution cost. Immediacy traders are the public market orders 
(items (i) and (ii) above) and the traders who initiate the negotiation process (item (iii)). 
Immediacy trading involves the placement of market orders, active searching for the contra 
party or wanting to trade. The more anxious an investor is to acquire or to dispose of shares at 
current market prices, the larger the price concession he or she would make to trade 
immediately. Transaction certainty can be obtained by placing market orders. Non-
immediacy trading involves the placement of limit orders and passive waiting for the arrival 
of a counter party to the trade. Non-immediacy traders are limit order traders (item (i)), the 
specialist or dealer (item (ii)), and the trader who does not initiate the negotiation process 
(item (iii)). 
All limit orders implicitly have a lower probability of execution relative to market orders. 
These probabilities are determined by the volatility of the stock being traded and the 
investor’s trading horizon. Further, if one assumes heterogenous trading horizons and rank-
dependent probabilities, it is possible for the different limit orders to be indexed and a series 
of indifference curves to be identified. 
Immediacy, the counter-party to non-immediacy, is a necessary by-product of trading and is 
provided freely in any organised asset markets when participants transmit their demand 
propensities to the market in the form of limit orders (see Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and 
Whitcomb (1981)). Hence, while certain participants such as dealers and specialists do indeed 
(at a price) provide immediacy, they are not the only providers. 
In this paper we develop a model of non-immediacy trading and illustrate some of the 
distributional characteristics via a simple simulation. Our model is in line with the observed 
fact, in common with Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981), that “a market is 
composed of many ordinary traders who may periodically transmit either limit or market 
orders (or else nothing) depending on the resolution of their own optimal order placement 
strategies”. Consequently, the limit orders of some traders can be said to explicitly establish 
the market for a security and provide immediacy to other traders who trade via market orders. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, buy/sell and bid/ask expectations, immediacy 
and non-immediacy are defined and discussed. Section 3 discusses equilibrium and non-
equilibrium pricing in the context of immediacy and non-immediacy. Immediacy and non-
immediacy curves are defined and illustrated in Section 4 followed by a simulated immediacy 
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and non-immediacy trading in Section 5. In Section 6, conclusions with possible implications 
for further research are presented. Section 7 is the appendix where the various order types are 
explained and is followed by the reference list in Section 8.  
 
2 Buy/Sell and Bid/Ask Expectations 
There are in each act of exchange, two mutually exclusive decisions being made by each 
participant, one to buy and the other to sell. For the buyer, the estimate of the expectation of 
the change in the price for the stock is positive, while the seller’s estimate of the same 
quantity is negative. However, the bid prices represent prices at which a buyer is willing to 
acquire a stock (and pay cash) and the ask positions represent prices at which a seller is 
willing to dispose of a stock, and hence receive cash. Consequently, the expectations of 
outcomes when investing and when trading are mutually opposite to each other.  
Let { }tx  denote a sequence of random price changes and let  1{ , ,...}t t tx x −Ω =  denote a set of 
conditioning information or information set based on the past history of tx . In addition, let 
[ ]E .  be the expectation operator and [ ]E .η  be the conditional expectation operator dependent 
on the parameter,η , where 1 η≤ ≤ ∞ . The buy and sell expectations are then defined as (see 
Jeyasreedharan (2004)): 
(1.1) buy t t -1E [x | ] 0Ω ≥  
(1.2) sell t t -1E [x | ] 0Ω ≤  
where buyE  is the buy-side expectation of the investment price changes, sellE  is the sell-side 
expectation of the investment price changes and t-1Ω  is the information set at time { 1}t − . 
However, the quoted prices represent decisions at which a buyer is willing to acquire a stock 
(and sell money) and a seller is willing to dispose of a stock, and hence receive money. The 
corresponding bid-ask expectations (or quote prices) are not equal to but are opposite to the 
ex-ante buy-sell expectations and are defined as: 
(1.3) bid1 t t -1E [x | ] 0η≥ Ω ≤  
(1.4) ask1 t t -1E [x | ] 0η≥ Ω ≥  
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where bid1Eη≥  is the bid-expectation of the trading outcomes and 
ask
1Eη≥  is the ask-expectation of 
the trading outcomes conditional on the non-immediacy parameter 1 η≤ ≤ ∞ . 
The trader, knowing there may be eager buyers and sellers, will try to maximise the trading-
utility (gains) by obtaining the best price possible away from the current market price. This 
maximisation means getting higher prices for ask-quotes and lower prices for bid-quotes. 
This is achieved by issuing limit orders and waiting for the transaction to occur. Implicitly 
this means increasing the weighting of low probability outcomes and is equivalent to the 
maximisation of probabilities conditional on waiting or non-immediacy times and the 
decision to buy or sell.  These conditional maximisations must be rank-dependent to ensure 
transitivity and monotonicity in the order functions. Consequently, the conditional bid-ask 
expectations can be defined more explicitly as: 
(1.5) ) ( )( ) |bid bid1 t t -1 t -1 t -1 t -1XE [x | ] = u(x d g F x 0η≥ Ω • Ω ≤∫ D  
(1.6) ) ( )( ) |ask ask1 t t -1 t -1 t -1 t -1XE [x | ] = u(x d g F x 0η≥ Ω • Ω ≥∫ D  
where 1 [1 ]bidg F F η= − −D  and askg F Fη=D  and 1 η≤ ≤ ∞ , is the non-immediacy 
parameter. The transformation functions ( ) 1 [1 ]bidg F F η= − −D  and ( )askg F Fη=D  are 
rank-dependent by definition (see Quiggin (1982, Quiggin (1985, Quiggin (1993) for 
transitivity, monotonicity and rank-dependency). These bid and ask expectations are 
analogous to the “indexed”4 limit orders of Black (1995), meaning an inherent preference 
ordering is maintained. The bid-ask rank-dependent price changes can then be determined as 
follows: 
(1.7) 
1
1
1
1
1
( ( ))
(1 [1 ( )] )
and 
c a
t t
c b
t t
a c b
t t t
F F x x
F F x x
x x x
η
η
−
−
−
−
−
=
− − =
≥ ≥
 
where Fη  is the rank-dependent transformation, 1(.)F −  is the inverse of the cumulative 
distribution function, (.)F , 1
c
tx −  is the most recent relative change
5  in the clearing price, atx  
is the relative change in the ask price expected and btx  is the relative change in the bid price 
                                             
4 The term indexed limit orders was defined and used by Black [1995]. 
5 Relative change means any change relative to the previous period’s price. 
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expected and η  is the non-immediacy preference parameter. When traders are indifferent to 
their time-to-execution, they can be assumed to trade via market orders with 1η =  
(immediacy=non-immediacy) and consequently: 
(1.8) 
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
( ( ))
(1 [1 ( )] )
and 
c a
t t
c b
t t
a c b
t t t
F F x x
F F x x
x x x
η
η
− =
−
− =
−
−
=
− − =
= =
 
where the bid and ask price changes and the clearing price changes are equal.6  
The following relationships are then inferred from the preceding arguments: 
(1.9) { }
buy/sell bid/ask
t t -1 t t -1
bid ask
t t t -1 t t -1 t t -1
F [x | ] F [x | ]
F x | F [x | ];F [x | Ω ] F[x | ]
η
η η
Ω ≠ Ω
≠ Ω ≠ Ω  
where buy/sell t t -1F [x | ]Ω  are the cumulative distributions conditioned on beliefs and 
information and bid/ask t t -1F [x | ]η Ω  are the cumulative distributions conditioned on preferences 
and information. Beliefs are reflected in the buy-sell choices conditioned on historical price 
information. Immediacy/non-immediacy preferences are reflected in the limit orders 
conditioned on historical price information. 
In the light of the discussion above, a new classification of traders is warranted: immediate 
and non-immediate traders. Immediate traders demand immediacy. Non-immediate traders 
(dealers, specialists and ordinary traders) provide immediacy. Immediate traders place market 
orders and non-immediate traders place limit orders. This unique approach allows all market 
participants to be simply classified and grouped into demanders and providers of immediacy.7 
 
2.1 Immediacy 
Keynes (1936) defined animal spirits as “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, 
and not the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative 
probabilities”. This spontaneous urge for action rather than inaction is analogous to the 
                                             
6 This equality is characteristic of rational expectation models where traders are assumed to be indifferent to 
their time-to-execution. 
7 This approach differs from Cohen, Maier, et al. [1981], who separated the demanders from the providers of 
immediacy by using groups of ordinary traders and market makers.  
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concept of immediacy8. Handa and Schwartz (1996) define immediacy as immediate liquidity, 
and not liquidity per se. 
Immediacy traders use market orders to trade. For a buy-side market order this can be 
expressed as: 
(1.10) 1 -1 1 -1[ | ] [ | ]
buy ask
t t t tE x E xη η≤ >Ω ≥ Ω  
and for a sell-side market order and 
(1.11) 1 -1 1 -1[ | ] [ | ]
bid sell
t t t tE x E xη η> ≤Ω ≤ Ω  
where tx  is the change in price at time t , { }buy bid1 t t -1 >1 t t -1E [x | ];E [x | ]η η≤ Ω Ω  are the buy/bid-
expectations operators and { }sell ask1 t t -1 >1 t t -1E [x | ];E [x | ]η η≤ Ω Ω  are the sell/ask-expectations 
operators both conditional on the common information set t -1Ω  with the non-immediacy 
parameter, 0 1η< ≤ 9 ,for the buy-sell expectations and with the non-immediacy parameter, 
1 η< < ∞ , for the bid-ask expectations. Immediacy traders are generally willing to pay the 
prices expected by non-immediacy traders and often trade at inferior prices10. 
 
2.2 Non-immediacy 
Non-immediacy11 is defined here as “a non-spontaneous urge to inaction rather than action, 
and the outcome of a rank-dependent weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by 
quantitative (subjective) probabilities”. A rational trader, who would generally be less 
animal-like in nature and hence less spontaneous, will be expected to take into careful 
consideration all possibilities and probabilities of outcomes when faced with a choice. 
An investor who makes only necessary portfolio adjustments or who does not react to news 
would be more willing to risk missing a particular trade and, accordingly, such an investor 
                                             
8 The literal meaning of immediacy is “short latency of response; promptness; spending more time with another; 
spending time with another when they choose”. 
9 When  0 1η< ≤ , the ensuring PDFs opposite to the bid-ask expectations. 
10 Inferior prices are buy orders that trade at high prices and sell orders that trade at low prices. See Harris 
[2002] for details. 
11 The literal meaning of non-immediacy is “long latency of response; delinquent about being on time; spending 
little time with another; often glances at watch/clock”. 
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can be deemed to be a non-immediate trader. Furthermore, a non-immediate seller ideally 
will expect the highest possible price. The highest possible price, however, is bounded by the 
trading horizon or the maximum time-to-execution of the trader. The highest possible price 
over one day is quite different from that possible over one month. The highest possible price 
is also bounded by the probability of the clearing prices. The distribution of the quotes will be 
such that all of the rank-dependent quotes will at least have some finite likelihood of 
execution. Non-immediacy traders place limit orders and are willing to wait with 1η > . This 
can be expressed as: 
(1.12) bid ask>1 t t -1 >1 t t -1E [x | ] < E [x | ]η ηΩ Ω ; 
where bid>1 t t -1E [x | ]η Ω  is the bid-expectations operator and ask1 t t -1E [x | ]η> Ω  is the ask-
expectations operator conditional on the common information set t -1Ω  with the non-
immediacy parameter, 1η > . By waiting, non-immediacy traders often trade at superior 
prices12. 
 
Figure 2-1: Immediacy and Non-immediacy/PDFs 
Notes: The buy-side immediacy PDFs are shown with filled down-arrows and the buy-side non-immediacy 
PDFs are shown with hollowed up-arrows. 
                                             
12 Superior prices are buy orders that trade at low prices and sell orders that trade at high prices. 
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In Figure 2-1 the buy-side immediacy and non-immediacy probability density functions 
(PDFs) are illustrated. The buy-side immediacy PDFs are shown with filled down-arrows and 
the buy-side non-immediacy PDFs are shown with hollowed down-arrows. Note that the buy-
side immediacy traders reveal their beliefs13 and preferences, but buy-side non-immediacy 
traders only reveal their preferences14 and not their beliefs. Immediacy traders, by issuing 
market orders, reveal their immediacy preferences and bullish-bearish beliefs. Non-
immediacy traders may belief the market to be bearish but, when non-immediate, will quote 
limit orders are higher than the current clearing prices; thus revealing their non-immediacy 
preferences but not their bearish beliefs. Trading expectations conditional on non-immediacy 
preferences, however, can be objectively determined, but trading expectations conditional on 
immediacy preferences are not measurable. Though the immediacy PDFs are illustrated in 
Figure 2-1, their actual distributional form or shape would be hard to determine as immediacy 
traders place market orders and thus there is no way of inferring the order of their 
immediacies. 
 
2.3 Conditional Immediacy  
Stop orders are conditional unlimited orders triggered by the market price reaching a 
predetermined threshold. A stop-loss (stop-gain) order issues an unlimited sell order to the 
exchange once the asset price falls below (rise above) a certain set price. Stop orders are used 
as a protection against unwanted losses (when owning a stock) or against unexpected rises 
(when planning to buy a stock). 
Hence a stop order converts to an immediate order once the asset price goes past a certain 
price. A stop-gain order converts to a market order to sell when the stock price crosses the 
stop price from below. A stop-loss order converts to a market order to sell when the stock 
price crosses the stop price from above. 
Hence a stop order is given as: 
(1.13) bid sell>1 t t -1 1 t t -1 tE [x | ] E [x | ]; for  x Kη η≤Ω ≥ Ω ≤  
                                             
13 This does not imply that immediacy traders are irrational. Given their preferences for immediacy, their actions 
can be deemed rational as long as their trades are at prices within their reservation prices. 
14 Non-immediacy traders stand ready to trade at prices well away from their reservation prices. 
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for a stop-loss order and  
(1.14) bid sell>1 t t -1 1 t t -1 tE [x | ] E [x | ]; for  x Kη η≤Ω ≥ Ω ≥  
for a stop-gain order where K  is the stop price. 
A stop-limit order is given as: 
(1.15) bid ask1 t t -1 1 t t -1 tE [x | ] E [x | ]; for  x Kη η> >Ω < Ω ≤  
for a stop-limit loss order and 
(1.16) bid ask1 t t -1 1 t t -1 tE [x | ] E [x | ]; for  x Kη η> >Ω < Ω ≥  
for a stop-limit gain order where K  is again the stop price. Analogous conditions can be 
defined for start orders and start-limit orders on the buy-side.  
 
3 Types of Pricing 
3.1 Equilibrium Pricing 
Ideally, an exchange market is assumed to bring together information on listed stocks in a 
manner that, in principle, “makes for perfectly informed behaviour by both buyers and 
sellers” (see Else and Curwen (1990)). A single offer to buy or sell a stock is assumed not to 
affect the price as set by the market. Further, the buying and selling is also assumed to be 
instantaneous.  
Under these conditions, the demand and supply curves for a stock can be deemed to intersect 
at an equilibrium price as shown in Figure 3-1. The demand curve is annotated as D/n=1 
which means a “demand curve with an immediacy of 1n = ”. The supply curve is annotated 
as S/n=1 which means a “supply curve with an immediacy of 1n = ”.  
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Figure 3-1: Demand and Supply Curves/PDFs 
Notes: D=demand curve; S=Supply curve; n=immediacy=1; Pa=ask price; Pb=bid price; E(P)=equilibrium or 
expected price. 
Further, as shown in the left-panel of Figure 3-1, the equilibrium price, ( )E P , the bid price, 
bP , and the ask price, aP , are the same at any one instant
15. The right-panel depicts the 
distribution of the equilibrium prices over a period of time. Note that the distribution of the 
equilibrium prices imply that the trade and quote prices are identical and symmetric (right-
panel in Figure 3-1 has only one PDF depicted). As the distribution of the bid-quotes and ask-
quotes are also assumed to be identical, the bid-ask spread is zero. 
 
3.2 Immediacy Pricing 
While, over time, the number of sellers might equal the number of buyers, at any particular 
point in time such an outcome is not guaranteed. Traders, in practice, transmit their orders 
sporadically during trading sessions.  Demsetz (1968) examined the behaviour of prices 
                                             
15 The equilibrium price is the price at which the aggregate buy-quote order function equals the aggregate sell-
quote order function. 
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under such conditions and considered the possibility of two equilibrium points based on the 
immediacy of trades. 
On the demand side, there is one demand arising from agents who want to buy immediately, 
and another demand representing the traders who want to buy but do not feel the need to do 
so immediately. The supply side is defined analogously. If there is an imbalance of traders 
wanting to buy now, then either some buyers have to wait for sellers to arrive, or they can 
offer a higher price to induce waiting sellers to transact now. 
 
Figure 3-2: Immediacy Costs/Inside Spread (Pa-Pb) 
Notes: Immediacy costs refer to inventory costs, waiting costs, commissions, taxes, communication expenses, 
and so forth etc. D/n=Demand/immediacy; D/n=Supply/immediacy. 
Similarly, if there is an imbalance of sellers wanting to trade now, a lower price must be bid 
to induce more buyers to trade now (see Demsetz (1968)). At any point in time there are two 
possible representations of supply and demand in the market. As shown in Figure 3-2, the 
two sources of supply and demand results in two, not one, equilibrium prices. These two 
supply curves and demand curves reflect the two time frames of the trading process; trading 
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now or trading later. The “inside” spread reflects the immediacy costs and is defined as 
{ }Pa Pb− . 
 
3.3 Non-immediacy Pricing 
Trading, however, involves two types of uncertainties (see Schwartz and Whitcomb (1988)): 
(i) Price uncertainty: the opportunity cost of trading at inferior prices (buying at 
prices that are abnormally high or selling at prices that are abnormally low); and 
(ii) Transaction uncertainty: the opportunity cost of missing a trade because a buy 
order was priced too low, or because a sell order was priced too high. 
In the presence of price and transaction uncertainty, the clearing price will differ from the 
equilibrium price thus impairing the informational accuracy of the market price. In a call 
market, where all orders are batched together, a desired clearing price could be achieved 
under the following conditions (see Schwartz and Whitcomb (1988)): 
(i) investors have unbiased expectations concerning the clearing price, and 
(ii) the order functions of buyers and sellers are distributed symmetrically around the 
expected clearing price. 
If expectations, however, are biased and if the intensity with which some investors wish to 
buy is not exactly matched by the intensity with which other investors wish to sell, the order 
functions of buyers and sellers will be distributed asymmetrically around the expected 
clearing price. Consequently, the market clearing price will be perturbed from the expected 
clearing price (see Ho, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1985)). 
If the prices established in the call market can be perturbed by individuals reacting to the 
transaction price uncertainty, so too are the prices established in the continuous market where 
trades are made between individual pairs of buyers and sellers, as orders arrive sequentially. 
A trader can trade strategically by “waiting” or being patient and place a limit order to obtain 
better prices. The trader who submits a market order or is immediate must take into account 
both the immediacy and non-immediacy costs. Demsetz (1968)‘s “immediacy” argument is 
complemented in this paper with the concept of “non-immediacy”. The non-immediate 
demand/supply curves (for 5η = ) are shown in Figure 3-3 as the light dashed lines '/ 5D η =  
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and '/ 5S η =  passing through the points AP  and BP  (the ask and bid-prices of non-
immediacy). 
 
Figure 3-3: Non-immediacy Demand/Supply Curves/PDFs 
Notes: PA=price of non-immediacy when D”/n=Demand/non-immediacy=5; PB=price of non-immediacy when 
S”/n=Supply/non-immediacy=5; All other symbols as explained under Figure 3-1 Notes. PA minus PB is the 
outside spread. 
The “outside” spread reflects the non-immediacy costs and is defined as { }PA PB−  and is 
shown in Figure 3-3. The PDFs on the right panel in Figure 3-3 illustrates the distinct 
separation of the bid and ask distributions. As market participants use trading strategies based 
on non-immediacy pricing when they seek to trade, the “inside” spread is not the only spread 
traders need to price into their order functions. 
Now, not all traders have the same non-immediacy preferences. Some traders may be willing 
to wait longer than others. Each trader’s non-immediacy preference is subjectively 
determined and as such there will be a range of non-immediacy demand/supply curves 
implicit in the order functions. 
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Figure 3-4: Multiple Non-Immediacy Demand/Supply Curves/PDFs 
Notes: PA3, PA6 and PA9 are the clearing prices for S”/n=Supply/non-immediacy=3,6 and 9. PB3, PB6 and 
PB9 are the clearing prices for D”/n=Demand/non-immediacy=3,6 and 9. The legend is the same for the PDF 
plot. All other symbols are as indicated under Figure 3-1 Notes. 
 
In Figure 3-4 a range of demand/supply curves for varying non-immediacy values of η  is 
depicted. The longer a trader is willing to wait, the higher will be the ask-prices and lower the 
bid-prices and the demand/supply curves shift to the left along the x-axis in the left-panel. 
Correspondingly, based on rank-dependent transformations, the PDFs shift outwards to the 
top and bottom along the y-axis in the right-panel. 
The clearing price is the price at which individual quotes match counterparty quotes whereas 
the equilibrium price is the price at which the aggregate buy-quote order function equals the 
aggregate sell-quote order function. Clearing or transaction prices (as the result of non-
synchronous trading) can be different from equilibrium prices. Consequently, the market 
clearing prices are not necessarily the equilibrium prices. 
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4 Immediacy and Non-immediacy Curves 
If traders are not indifferent to their time-to-execution then one needs a way of depicting their 
time-preferences. One way of doing this is via “quantile-quantile” plots. 
A quantile-quantile (QQ) plot is a graphical technique that can be used to determine whether 
two data sets come from populations with a common distribution. A QQ-plot is a plot of the 
quantiles of the first data set against the quantiles of the second data set. A 45-degree baseline 
is generally depicted in the plots. If the two sets come from a population with the same 
distribution, the points should fall approximately along this 45-degree baseline. The greater 
the departure from this baseline, the greater the evidence for the conclusion that the two data 
sets originate from populations with different distributions.  A QQ-plot of quote log-returns 
versus trade log-returns (with the trades on the x-axis and the quotes on the y-axis) results in 
the data points forming a curved line placed well away from the 45-degree baseline. The 
curved line depicts the relative change in quote prices expected by traders for a specific non-
immediacy (time-preference) given the current relative change in trade prices. The shift in 
relative changes can also be depicted as a PDF of relative changes. These formulations can be 
illustrated using QQ-plots. 
 
Figure 4-1: QQ-plots and PDFs 
Notes: The bottom-panel depicts the PDF of the trade price relative changes. In the middle-panel, the “concave” 
curve above the diagonal line is the sell (ask) non-immediacy curve with n=3. The left-panel depicts the PDF for 
non-immediacy quotes with n=3. 
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Figure 4-1 shows how the distribution of the relative changes in the trade prices (in the 
bottom panel) is translated into a distribution for the relative changes in the ask-quote prices 
for =3η  (in the left panel). Note that the quote distribution in the left-panel is “fat” upper tail 
and a “thin” lower tail. This asymmetrical distortion in the probabilities is due to the 
nonlinear transformation of the probabilities using rank-dependency as depicted by the non-
linear non-immediacy curve in Figure 4-1. 
The i -th quantile for the ask-quote price is simply the appropriate rank-dependent quantile 
function evaluated at the i -th quantile for the trade price. The non-linearity effect depends on 
the order of non-immediacy, η , of the trader and the range of trade prices over the trading 
horizon. 
 
Figure 4-2: Ask-QQ-plots 
Notes: In the left-panel, the “concave” curve above the diagonal line is the sell non-immediacy line with n=2 
and the “convex” curve below the diagonal line is the sell non-immediacy line with n=1/2.  
In the left-panel of Figure 4-2 are two QQ-plot curves; a non-immediacy curve and an 
immediacy curve. The seller’s (ask) non-immediacy curve is depicted by hollowed up-arrows 
and the seller’s (ask) immediacy curve is depicted by filled up-arrows. A seller who is non-
immediate will quote or only accept a price higher than the last clearing price. A seller who is 
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immediate will quote or accept a price lower than or equal to the last clearing price and will 
have a higher likelihood of execution. The only difference between these two curves is their 
degree of non-immediacy. The non-immediacy curve in Figure 4-2 is for 2η =  and the 
immediacy curve is for 1/ 2η = . 
The 45-degree diagonally dotted line depicts the quote and trades prices when n=1 and when 
traders are immediacy/non-immediacy indifferent. The right-panel traces the PDFs for the 
corresponding QQ-plot curves and the 45-degree diagonal line as done in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-3: Bid-QQ-plots 
Notes: In the left-panel, the “concave” curve above the diagonal line is the buy non-immediacy line with n=1/2 
and the “convex” curve below the diagonal line is the buy non-immediacy line with n=2. 
In Figure 4-3 the buy-side non-immediacy and immediacy curves are illustrated. The buy-
non-immediacy curve is depicted by filled down-arrows and the buy-immediacy curve is 
depicted by hollowed down-arrows. An immediacy indifferent buyer with 1η = , will on 
average expect to trade at the current prices. A more immediate buyer of average will expect 
to trade at a higher price. A less immediate buyer will expect to obtain a lower price by 
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waiting for a better price. The right-panel illustrates the PDFs for the corresponding QQ-plot 
curves and the 45-degree diagonal line. 
 
Figure 4-4: Multiple Immediacy Curves/PDFs 
Notes: In the left panel, the non-immediacy curve (n=10) is the black up-arrowed curve and the multiple 
immediacy curves are the grey down-arrowed curves. The right panel shows the PDFs for the time-preference 
curves in the right panel. 
The left-panel in Figure 4-4 shows a number of buy-immediacy curves (grey down-arrows) 
together with one sell-non-immediacy curve (black up-arrows) having a time-preference of 
order =10η . A trade occurs if an immediacy buyer is willing to transact at the prices quoted 
by the non-immediacy trader as represented by the black up-arrows. A non-immediacy curve 
can be analytically determined conditional on the trader’s non-immediacy-preferences using 
Equation (1.7). The immediacy curves, however, are not analytically tractable, meaning that 
they can only be inferred from the actual clearing prices but cannot be determined uniquely. 
This indeterminacy is because the market orders are bound by the prevailing non-immediacy 
prices. Consequently, the prices set by the non-immediacy traders determine the clearing 
prices. Alternatively, the clearing prices are determined in immediacy/non-immediacy space 
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where non-immediacy traders stand ready to transact with immediacy traders. Accordingly, 
immediacy traders are “price-takers” and non-immediacy traders are “price-setters”.16 
 
Figure 4-5: Non-immediacy Curves and PDFs 
Notes: The up-arrows are the ask non-immediacy curves and ask-quote PDFs and the down-arrows are the bid 
non-immediacy curves and bid-quote PDFs.  The continuous line depicts the immediacy neutral or indifferent 
curves and the trade PDF. 
The Figure 4-5 illustrates together the sell-side and buy-side non-immediacy curves and their 
associated PDFs for =1.3η  and 5η = . The higher the order of the non-immediacy curves, 
the more curved the corresponding quantile function. For low orders of non-immediacies, the 
trade PDF can be seen as a mixture of rank-dependent quote PDFs but for higher orders of 
non-immediacies, the quote PDFs are quite distinct and distant from the trade PDF. 
4.1 Inside and Outside Spreads 
The inside spread is generally regarded as the implicit cost of immediacy (see Demsetz 
(1968) and Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979)). In contrast, Treynor (1987) 
                                             
16 By this definition market-makers are also price-setters but price-setters do not have to be market-makers. 
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identified the “outside-spread”17 and not the “inside-spread”18 as the true cost of immediacy. 
The outside spread is defined as the difference between the highest ask-price and the lowest 
bid-price over a particular trading horizon. 
 
Figure 4-6: Inside and Outside Spreads 
Notes: The inside spread is depicted by dashed horizontal lines in the line left-panel and the outside spread is 
delineated by bold horizontal lines in the left panel. 
In Figure 4-6 the dashed horizontal lines in the left-panel define the bounds of the inside 
spread or market spread. The continuous horizontal lines define the bounds of the outside 
spread. The outside spread is many times larger than the inside spread and thus the true cost 
of immediacy might be many times more that that assumed by considering only the inside 
spread. 
 
                                             
17 A spread larger than the minimum tick is referred to as a non-trivial spread. An outside spread, by definition, 
is a non-trivial spread. An inside spread can be either a trivial or non-trivial spread.  
18 The inside spread is also known as the market spread. 
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5 Immediacy and Non-Immediacy Trades 
Given the assumptions of immediacy and non-immediacy, one can formulate a very simple 
trading model to illustrate the dynamics involved in trading. Assume that only non-
immediacy traders with =6η  are present in the market. Figure 5-1 depicts the buy order non-
immediacy curve (down arrowed) and the sell order non-immediacy curve (up arrowed) with 
=6η . 
Figure 5-1: Non-immediacy/ Immediacy Trading [n=6] 
Notes: The non-immediacy curves are of order n=6. The first 10 trades are arrowed in and the first 6 trades are 
listed together with the bid-ask quotes. The probability of a bid or a ask trade is 1/2 or equal.  
If the last relative19 trade price was at 6.00  (all trades are referenced back to the diagonal) 
with a particular likelihood, then the new relative bid/ask prices become 0.90 / 6.99  as 
quoted by non-immediate traders with a non-immediacy of 6  and with the same likelihood. 
Say an immediate buyer then decides to trade at the asking-price of 0.90 . This price then 
becomes the current clearing price. The new non-immediacy quotes with the same likelihood 
                                             
19 The prices are relative, as they refer to the last clearing price of 0 (zero). 
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of 0.90  are now -0.58/1.93 (bid/ask). Another immediate seller then transacts at 1.93  
giving rise to a new current clearing price. Continuing with this process of price generation, 
trades can be deemed to occur at the prices 0.90, 1.93, -0.12, 1.07 -0.49  and so on until 
the trade numbered 10 as shown in Figure 5-1 above. 
Figure 5-2: Non-immediacy/ Immediacy Trading [n=2-10] 
Notes: The non-immediacy curves are of orders n=2 to 10. The first 10 trades are arrowed in and the first 6 
trades are listed together with the bid-ask quotes. The probability of a bid or a ask trade is assumed to be 1/2 (or 
equal). 
As non-immediacy is assumed to be heterogenous, there will be differing non-immediacy 
traders who will compete in the marketplace and as such assume now there is “zone” of order 
functions as shown in Figure 5-2. The quotes placed by non-immediacy traders will then be 
“picked” off by immediacy traders as they arrive at the market. The net result of such 
behaviour can be simulated and is depicted in Figure 5-3 below. 
The top panel in Figure 5-3 shows the “tick-data” and the lower panel shows the “block-data” 
as simulated using the simple trading model described in Figure 5-2 above. Tick-data lists 
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every trade and inside quotes. Block-data list only trades occurring at the close of each 
“block” and the maximum and minimum quotes in that block are listed. 
Figure 5-3: Tick-data and Block-data 
Notes: Top panel shows tick-by-tick data. Bottom panel shows block-by-block data. The ask-quotes are in up-
arrows and the bid-quotes are the down-arrows. The trades are the dots. 
The tick-data plot in the top panel distinctively shows that the generally trades occur at the 
inside quotes. The block-data in the lower panel, however, shows that the trades do 
sometimes occur at the outside quotes. Only a small percentage of the total trades occur at the 
outside quotes. This phenomenon is as expected, as only some of the close prices of the 
block-by-block data occur as the highest or lowest prices. 
Figure 5-4 illustrates the inside-quote PDFs and outside-quote PDFs for quote prices. The 
trade returns are depicted by the vertically lined PDF. The inside quote PDFs are depicted by 
the stepped PDFs. 
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Figure 5-4: Inside and Outside PDFs 
Notes: The trade returns are depicted by the vertically lined PDF. The inside quote PDFs are depicted by the 
stepped PDFs. The arrowed PDFs indicate the outside quotes. 
The arrowed PDFs indicate the outside quotes. A large overlap occurs between the inside 
quote PDFs, whereas the outside quote PDFs have minimal overlap. The inside- and the 
outside- cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) are illustrated in Figure 5-5. If one 
considers the distributions of the quotes and trades over the trading horizon, one notes that 
the CDFs are ordered: the bid CDF is on the left, the trade CDF is in the middle and the offer 
or ask CDF is on the right in each panel. 
 26
 
Figure 5-5: Inside and Outside CDFs 
Notes: The left-panel shows the CDFs for the inside-quotes with the trade CDF in the middle. The right-panel 
shows the CDFs for outside-quotes with the trade CDF in the middle. 
From a CDF perspective, the right-panel shows the trade-CDF as a possible “convolution” of 
the outside-CDFs and the left-panel shows the trade PDF as a possible “mixture” of the inside 
CDFs (see Jeyasreedharan (2004). These plots are identical to the “S-curves” depicted by 
Treynor (1987) for defining and describing the outside spreads. 
 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper the concept of non-immediacy was defined and shown to be analytically 
tractable. Immediacy traders place market orders, whereas non-immediacy traders place limit 
orders. Immediacy and non-immediacy trading gives rise to clearing prices that are not 
necessarily the equilibrium prices. 
The immediacy and non-immediacy concepts introduced enabled the representation of 
conditional trading expectations based on immediacy/non-immediacy preferences. As these 
conditional expectations are derived as exact functions of the underlying objective 
distributions of the clearing prices, one is able to define the exact analytical functions for 
different groups of non-immediacy traders. The analytical functions are shown to be rank-
dependent to maintain conditions of monotonicity and transitiviy. As non-immediacy is 
heterogenous, a range of non-immediacy traders will compete in the marketplace and as such 
there will be a “zone” of order functions. The quotes placed by non-immediacy traders will 
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then be “picked” off by immediacy traders as they arrive. Consequently, the distribution of 
the trade prices can be modelled as a mixture of inside-quote distributions. 
It follows that immediacy is a consequence of non-immediacy trading and is provided freely 
in any organised asset markets when participants transmit their demand propensities to the 
market in the form of limit orders. While certain participants such as dealers and specialists 
do indeed (at a price) provide immediacy, they need not be the only providers. 
 
7 Appendix: Order Types 
Market participants reveal their trading preferences, in regards to immediacy, by the types of 
orders they place. Traders who are relatively anxious to transact at a given clearing price 
submit buy orders that are relatively high or sell orders that are priced relatively low, all else 
equal. Conversely, traders who are not eager to transact at a given clearing price submit buy 
orders that are relatively low, or sell orders that are priced relatively high, or may not seek to 
trade at all. A trader can issue various types of orders to execute his or her trades. These 
orders can either be market orders or limit orders and/or stop orders and are discussed below.  
 
7.1 Market Orders 
A market order is also called an unlimited order. When a market order is issued, an asset is 
bought or sold at the prevailing market prices. A market order guarantees a transaction 
(provided of course counterparty quotes are available). A market order does not carry any 
other additional specifications. The distribution of market order prices will be similar to 
distribution of clearing prices as every transaction requires at least one market order to 
consummate a trade (not taking into account any negotiated trades). 
 
7.2 Limit Orders 
Limit orders are executed only when the market price is above (for a sell order) or below (for 
a buy order) a certain threshold set by the investor. A limited-sell order guarantees a minimal 
price (highest offer) for the sale of an asset. A limited-buy order, vice versa, guarantees a 
maximal price (lowest bid) for the purchase of the assets. A limit order however, does not 
guarantee a transaction.  
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In principle, an investor’s desire to trade at any given price can be measured if the investor is 
able to state a limit order price at which he or she is willing to trade (see Schwartz (1988)). 
The limit order price is the maximum price for a buy order or the minimum price for a sell 
order. At the limit order price an investor would be indifferent between transacting and not 
trading at all. Implicit in this statement is the notion that the distribution of limit order prices 
will be analogous to the distribution of quote prices as all quote prices are in reality limit 
order prices. 
 
7.3 Stop Orders 
Stop orders are conditional unlimited orders triggered by the market price reaching a 
predetermined threshold. A stop-loss (stop-buy) order issues an unlimited or limited-sell (-
buy) order to the exchange once the asset price falls below (rise above) a certain set price. 
Stop orders are used as a protection against unwanted losses (when owning a stock) or 
against unexpected rises (when buying a stock). The distribution of stop order prices is harder 
to establish. If one assumes, however, that traders who use stop orders are aware of non-
immediacy trading, then these distributions should also be similar to the limit order price 
distributions. 
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